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Proxy Contest Expenses and
Shareholder Democracy*
Franklin C. Latcham and Frank D. Emerson
IN
year of a Presidential Election a great amount of interest has been
centered upon the problem of getting citizens to register and vote. And,
of course, this interest is well directed for in a democratic society the ultimate control of the citizenry over the course of their government depends
upon their effective utilization of the voting privilege.
The analogy between the citizen in,a democratic society and the stock-

holder in a corporation is a fair close one from a theoretical legal point
of view. In theory, the final power over the destiny of the government in
the one case and over the
destiny of the corporation
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in the other lies in the
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hands of these individuals.
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Law at Western Reserve University. FRANK D.
And these fundamental
E miON (B.A., 1938, University of Akron;
powers are only protected
LL.B., 1940, Western Reserve University) is
by their untrammeled right
Interpretative Attorney for the Cleveland Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange
to vote after full and free
Commission, and a Lecturer in Law at Western
discussion.
Reserve University. In addition to individual
Indeed, the voting
contributions to various law reviews, the authors have collaborated in publishing articles
rights of a member of a
on the proxy regulation and "shareholder depolitical corporation or a
mocracy" in the Yale Law Journal and the Unishareholder of a commerversity of Chucago Law Review.
cial corporation were considered so valuable under
the common law that neither of them could be delegated.' In the corporate
field, it has only been since the establishment of state general corporation
acts in the latter part of the nineteenth century that stockholders were permitted to vote by proxy. Stockholders had to attend the shareholders'
meetings in person or forfeit their right to vote.2
Of course, in the modem large corporation, or even in one of medium
While one of the writers is in the employ of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the opinions expressed are the writer's and not necessarily those of the
Commission.

11BALLANTIn,

CooiATioNs 408 (2d ed. 1946);

3 Coox, CORPoRATioNs

2130 (8th ed. 1923); STEvENs, CoRPORATIONS 532 (2d ed. 1949).

'The principal English common law cases are: Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch. D. 14,
32, 35 (1882); Attorney-General v. Scott, 1 Vesey 413, 417-418 (1749); Re Dean
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size, shares are so widely held that it would be physically impossible for all
of the shareholders to attend an annual or special meenng. Even if the
shareholder could afford the trip to the meeting place, in many cases it
would be Impossible to find an auditorium large enough to accommodate
them. Therefore, the right today of a shareholder to vote intelligently by
proxy is of primary importance.
Although the nineteenth century general corporation acts gave, and
their present day counterparts still give, stockholders the right to vote by
proxy, they both failed to provide for the companion right of affording
stockholders full information and opportunities for communication with
each other. This failure resulted in making a mere formality of the stockholders' meeting.4 Essentially the public shareholder remained disenfranchised. Since little or no information whatever was furnished the
stockholder and only the most general nonce of meetings was ordinarily
provided, no questions of full disclosure, much less of misrepresentation or
omissions to state material facts, ever came before the state courts in any
substantial volume. Under the state statutes the public stockholder was no
better situated than at the common law, and in addition he was compelled
to face the humility of having become a dummy. The state courts rarely
got beyond the formal problems of who may act as proxy holder, the execution of proxies, the duty of inspectors of election, the capacity to appoint a
proxy holder, the scope of the proxy holder's authority, the binding effect
of the proxy holder's unauthorized acts, and the revocation and termination
of proxies.5
With the federal securities legislation, less than two decades old, came
a restoration of the right of the public and the stockholder to a full disclosure of corporate affairs. Express provision for full disclosure to stockholders incident to efforts to obtain their proxies was provided by Congress in Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6 That section
gives the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to adopt regulaand Chapter of Fernes, Davies 116, 129 (1608). For an early American case see
Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1834), and see, also, Macklin v.
Nicollet Hotel, Inc., 25 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1928); Axe, Corporate Proxtes,41 MicH.
L. REv.38, 41 (1942).
'At the end of 1950, eight industrial corporations whose securities were listed on
the New York Stock Exchange had more than 100,000 common stockholders of
record. General Motors headed the list of industrials with 410,428. KIMMEL,
SHARE OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 130 (1952).
' The problem is nowhere better described than in BERLE AND MEANS, THE MoDERN CORPORATiON AND PRivATE PROPERTY 80-90, 139, 207, 244-245 (1932).
See also, RIPLEY, MAIN STRE AND WALL STREET (1927)

'See Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MIcH. L. REV. 225, 258 (1942); Bernstein and
Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. OF CHl. L. REV. 226, 227 (1940).
48 STAT. 893 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78n (1946).
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tions, not merely affording full disclosure, but to govern generally the
solicitation of proxies, consents, and authorizations relating to securities
listed on a stock exchange. Acting under this authority the Commission
has evolved rules 7 which are the present cornerstone of shareholder democracy.
These proxy rules reflect a three-way approach to the problems of the
modern stockholder, with various refinements added from time to time.
First, they provide for a full disclosure of all material information pertinent
to proposals for corporate action submitted by the management to the vote
of its shareholders through the proxy machinery. Secondly, resort by anyone to the use of fraud in the solicitation of proxies is made unlawful.
Thirdly, opportunity is afforded to stockholders themselves to solicit proxies
from their fellow stockholders and to obligate the management to include in
its proxy statement stockholder proposals for action 8 While the importance
of the proxy fraud and disclosure provisions can hardly be minimized, it
may well be that the opportunities afforded by the stockholder proposal
rule hold the greatest promise for progress toward stockholder democracy
and the salvation and growth of our corporate enterprise system. In the
very best Socratic tradition the proposal rule appears to have considerable
capacity for stimulating democratic growth through free discussion at almost all levels of modern corporate life.9
The proxy regulation, of course, has not been without its critics. There
are those who believe that the federal government should take no part in
ensuring stockholder democracy. And there are some who feel that the
proxy regulation is not a sufficiently strong measure to protect minority
stockholder interests and to guarantee that the public interest will be sufficiently reflected in corporate policies.' The fact remains, however, that
the proxy regulation is with us and it performs some extremely useful functions. Some of these may be summarized as follows.
First, realistic use of the stockholder's right under the proxy regulation
to receive information and to vote restores to him the opportunity to regain
the position he held at an earlier time. The proxy regulation is in accord
with the common law by way of recognition of the individualistic character
The proxy regulation of the SEC is known as Regulation X-14.
'For a detailed analysis of the proxy regulation see, Emerson and Latcham, SEC
Proxy Regulation: Steps Towards More Effective Stockholder Participation,59 YALE
L.J. 635; Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate Proxies, 63 HARV. L. REv. 796
(1950); Loss, SEcuRrnrm REGULATION 523 et seq. (1951).

'See Emerson and ILatcham, SEC Proxy Proposal Rule, The Corporate Gadfly, 19
U. OF Cm. L. REv. 807 (1952) and Further Insoght Into More Effective Stockholder Participation:The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429
(1951).
" For a summary of the various positions see REusc-.mEN, THE ScHooLs OF

CORPORATE REFoam (1950).
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of the exercise of the stockholder's judgment as to how he should vote his
shares. In a technological age such as this any opportunity for recognidon
of the dignity of the human being deserves attention, if for no reason other
than the resultant fortifying of moral fibre and intellectual development.
Secondly, stockholder democracy holds promise of rekindling on a
broader basis the spirit of individual inquiry and free discussion through
use of the SEC provisions for stockholder communication and proposals for
corporate action. This, too, is salutary in that it affords a haven for human
growth in an awesome atomic age.
It may be objected that traditionally the stockholder, of all people, has
shown a peculiarly high degree of indifference to what goes on in his corporation, and worse, that he would not understand it anyway. But how can
one be said to be indifferent to what for a long time he had not known nor
had an opportunity to learn about? How under such circumstances of
corporate blackout of information could there have been any stimulus to the
stockholder to attempt anything? Perhaps the greatest of all harms resulting from the lack of corporate publicity that was typical until the middle
thirties was the inertia it created among stockholders, a loss of considerably
greater proportions than the dollars that were wasted in frauds.
There is, moreover, impressive evidence that a start has already been
made to turning the tide of stockholder inertia and ignorance. But what
of the oft repeated assertion that stockholders not only have been, but still
are and will always be, without an understanding even in broad perspective
of matters relating to corporate operations? This scepticism seeks to sweep
out from under the stockholder the substantial degree of dignity he has
once again begun to realize. It also rejects the prospects for stockholder
education.
Happily, much evidence is at hand that the stockholder along with his
fellow members of the general public are being educated and experiencing
an awakening of the breadth of his intellectual capacities for corporate as
well as general understanding. Since corporate publicity became the standard under the federal securities laws there has been an increasingly larger
amount of literature dealing with accounting, economic analysis and interpretation of financial statements, annual reports, and related corporate
documents. This material has not remained entombed in the libraries and
book stores, but is being borrowed and purchased and taken home for study.
Photo-copies of information are being obtained from the SEC and attorneys,
accountants, statistical services, stock brokers, their member exchanges and
associations, and advisers and counselors of a wide variety are being consulted by stockholders more and more often with reference to corporate
affairs. The stockholder is becoming literate to a degree higher than perhaps even the most visionary could have foreseen.
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The proxy regulation, then, has been of material aid to the stockholder
as a voter by enlarging the scope of information he receives, by permitting
him to propose policy questions for the consideration of fellow stockholders and by allowing him to vote upon questions presented by other
stockholders. There is, however, another aspect of the problem which is
of primary importance in the conduct of a democratic government and
with which the proxy regulation does not deal. In a democratic society
rival groups must stand in a fairly equal position in regard to their opportunites to place issues and candidates before the voters. This is still not
true in the corporate world.
In a sharply contested proxy battle the cost of printing-and mailing such
material, along with other solicitation devices, may constitute substantial
outlays of money." Those in control of the corporation- the management. group-have always had an advantage in regard to financing such
solicitation for ordinarily they are permitted to pay for such expenses out
of the corporate treasury. Outside groups, however, have had to use their
own resources to cover the cost of canvassing fellow security holders. It is
the purpose of this paper to review the present case law development on
the subject of proxy expenses, and consider some suggestions for establishing
greater equality between management and opposition groups.
A.

Managemenes Proxy Expenses

A number of cases have settled the right of management to charge the
corporate treasury for the cost of soliciting proxies.' 2 The principal limitation which the courts have placed upon this right is that the solication must
concern "questions of corporate policy" rather than mere "matters of personnel:' The courts have justified corporate payment of expenditures on
the sound theory that:
. inasmuch as the stockholders are called upon to express their judgment
upon the soundness of a questioned policy, it is in the interest of an intelligent decision by them that they should be advised by the responsible
managers of the corporation -who formulated the policy what were the
considerations which induced their approval; and that it would be highly

unreasonable tor
require that the directors should personally defray the
For example, in the Sparks-Withington contest discussed in Emerson and Latcham,
FurtherInsight Into More Effective Stockholder Participation:The Sparks-Withingtoo Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429 (1951), the leader of the opposition group
spent his entire cash savings of $6,000 and management spent a total of $51,165"Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas
Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (DeL 1944); Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 29
Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d 741 (1946); Hall v. Trans-Lux Corp., 20 Del.Ch. 78, 171
At!. 226 (1934); Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916);
Peel v. London & N.W Ry. [1907] 1 Ch. 5. Friedman, Expenses of Corporate
Proxy Contest, 51 COL. L REv. 951 (1951); Comment, 49 MicK. L R v. 606

(1951).
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expense incident to the performance of a duty which rested upon them to

lay before the stockholders the information which is requisite for an informed decision in turn on their parte'

Certainly there can be no quarrel with such a statement of policy. It is
in accord with the fundamental concepts of stockholder democracy. The
areas left to explore are the limits, if any, to managements charging the
corporate treasury, and the possibility of placing outside groups in a position
of greater equality in regard to their solicitation expenses. The latter problem will be considered at a later point in this paper.
The limitation that solicitation must cover "questions of policy" rather
than "matters of personnel" is reduced to rather meaningless jargon when
prodded under careful investigation. One early case thought corporate
expenditures improper when they merely related to "proceedings by one
faction in its contest with another for control of the corporation."' 4 It is
difficult to determine from the court's opinion whether the expenditures
were disallowed because they were thought to be of a personal nature. The
case has been cited a number of times as standing for that proposition.
However, if that is the court's holding, the case stands alone for although
other courts have spoken of the limitation none of them have actually disapproved of corporate expenditures on that ground.15 The very courts
which purport to see the possibility of such a limitation also understand the
difficulty of applying it. For example, one court has said:
A question of policy which concerns very intimately the future of the
corporate business may turn upon the particular personnel of the directors
and officers. Indeed it often happens in practice that questions of policy
come up not as abstract propositions which are referred to the stockholders
for a yes or no vote, but in the form of whether the directors who stand

for the given policy shall be re-elected to office1
Actually, unless opposing directors are men of no ideas or policies at all, the
limitation has no meaning and might as well be forgotten by the courts.
Once the courts are clear that matters of policy are involved, they have
been liberal in allowing management to take all steps reasonably necessary
to insure that security holders receive pertinent facts and an opportunity to
express their opinion on issues. Thus it is proper for management to advertise in newspapers to inform stockholders concerning proposals.' 7 Material can be mailed to security holders, and management may enclose a
self-addressed, stamped envelope to facilitate the security holder in voting
"4Hall v. Trans-Lux Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 81, 171 Ad. 226, 227 (1934)
" Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry., 187 N.Y. 395, 399, 80 N.E. 199,

200 (1907).
" Cases cited note 12 supra.
"Hall v. Trans-Lux Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 171 At. 226, 228 (1934).

See also

Friedman, supra note 12, at 952. Comment, 49 M-cH. L. REV. 606 (1951).
'Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907).
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and the expression of his ideas to management.1 8 Furthermore, management may print and mail such follow-up material as is necessary to answer or
clarify statements made by the opposition group. 9 Additional material of
this type is necessary if security holders are to be fully informed. But last
minute telegrams and long-distance telephone calls sent by management
in an effort to obtain proxies, or to effect a "switching' of proxies, should
not be held to be a proper corporate expense. 20 Solicitation expenses must
stand the test of reasonableness as must all corporate outlays. If security
holders have received dear expositions from both sides through the mails,
there can be no justification for management charging the corporate treasury for bitter-end telephone and telegraphic messages.
These forms of pressure activities lead to a consideration of another type
of expense: the hiring of paid proxy solicitors. In another article the use
of paid professional solicitors by a management group is discussed by the
authors in some detail.2 1 In that situation paid solicitors were utilized by
management to aid in its efforts to retain control of the corporation.
It would seem that the propriety of hiring paid solicitors should again
be measured by the rule of the reasonableness of the expenditure. The basis
upon which the courts have permitted management to charge the corporate
treasury for solicitation expenses has been that dissemination of information to stockholders is necessary for their intelligent decision. But is the
use of paid solicitors necessary for the dissemination of information? It
does not seem that they are needed to supplement the information already
distributed by mail. The only use of such solicitors would be to attempt to
persuade stockholders to vote a certain way, a use which goes far beyond the
courts' justification for permitting solicitation expenditures to be charged
against the corporation. Also, there is the additional factor that the use
of solicitors paid by the corporation gives the management another advantage in a contest already slanted heavily in its favor.
The use of paid proxy solicitors in a contest over control or corporate
policies (the two being indistinguishable) should not constitute a proper
corporate expenditure. Of course, if the directors or officers wish to pay
for such expenses from their own pockets, that is perhaps a different matter.
Both sides should probably be allowed to hire professionals if they wish to
pay for them personally. It does not seem necessary to prohibit such expenditures entirely.
"'Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
'HalI v. Trans-Lux Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 At. 226 (1934).
=0See Emerson and Latcham, Further Insight Into More Effectsve Stockholder Participation:The Sparks. ithngton Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429, 445-449, 451452 (1951).
= itd.
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Another possible limitation upon expending funds for pressure soliciting is the factor of non-deductibility for income tax purposes. Commercial
enterprises are allowed a deduction under Section 23(a) (1) (A) of the
Internal Revenue Code for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
in carrying on any trade or business." The regulations include
22
"management expenses" as a part of deductible trade or business expenses.
Thus it seems that expenses incurred by the corporation in holding annual
or special meetings, including the cost of soliciting proxies, are deductible
as long as they are "ordinary and necessary," and not obviously for the benefit of individual directors or officers. 23 But would the cost of pressure
soliciting constitute "ordinary and necessary" expenditures of the corporation? By definition they would not seem to. Instead, they would appear to
be "extraordinary, unusual" and, perhaps, "extravagant." The Supreme
Court has specifically disallowed the deduction of business expenditures
coming under these last categories.2 - And, at least one federal court of
appeals has denied the deduction of business expenditures which were
"unreasonable' in amount, stating that the expenses were therefore not
"ordinary and necessary." 25 It would seem that amounts spent for pressure
soliciting would easily constitute "extraordinary and unusual" expenditures,
and would certainly be "unreasonable," from the standpoint of the corporation. These expenditures are not being used to inform the shareholders, but
to persuade them to adopt a specific position. Deduction of expenses relating to pressure soliciting should not be allowed.
If the corporation cannot deduct these amounts because they are not
"ordinary and necessary," neither can directors or officers deduct amounts
for pressure soliciting upon their personal returns even though they pay
for this solicitation from their own pockets. For whether the directors or
officers are claiming a business deduction under SectAon 23 (a) (1) (A), or
a non-business deduction under Section 23 (a) (2), both sections limit deductions to those which are "ordinary and necessary." 28 The same limitations
would also apply to expenses of non-management groups, if we assume
that their expenses are deductible under the Code, an assumption that is
27
far from clear.
"U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (a) (1) (1943).
'Cf. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 3 T.C.M. 15 (1944), adfd, 148 F.2d 460

(3d Cir. 1945).
'Botany

Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 49 Sup. Ct. 129 (1929)

Commissioner v. Lincoln Electric Co., 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. de-nmd,
338 U.S. 949, 70 Sup. Ct. 488 (1950).
'Note that the regulation interpreting Code § 23 (a) (2) specifically limits deductions under that section to those which "are reasonable in amount." U.S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(a)

(1943).

Ordinarily the opposition group would seek a deduction for their expenditures
under Code § 23(a) (2) which limits deductions to the "ordinary and necessary"
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There has been a suggestion that the corporation might properly hire
solicitors when it is necessary to obtain a specified percentage of the outstanding shares in order to take some corporate action. 28 Such a vote is
normally required in the case, for example, of a merger, consolidation, or
stock reclassification. There is merit in this suggestion, particularly in view
of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary vote by simply mailing proxies.
Generally, there is no personal advantage adhering to management through
such a proposed change, except the fact of benefit to the entire corporation.
Therefore, the fact that there may be opposition to the plan should not make
any difference. Insofar as paid solicitors are used merely to obtain a specified percentage of security holders to vote on an issue, or to obtain a quorum
at a meeting, the expense involved should be a proper corporate charge.
But if the use of solicitors is to retain incumbents in office, or to justify
existing policies, their hire should not be allowed as a corporate expense.
B.

Expenses of Opposuon Group

The discussion to this point has been limited to the problem of the
right of management to use corporate funds in a proxy contest. But what
of the opposition group? Must the "outs" forever stand the cost of urging
adoption of their policies and election of their directors out of their own
pockets? This aspect of the proxy solicitation problem has not received
extensive attention from the courts. The problem should be considered
carefully for two reasons. The first reason is that of more fully informing
the stockholders. The courts have permitted management to charge the
corporate treasury in order that stockholders may receive adequate information for an informed vote. Should not this argument also apply to the
material disseminated by opposition groups? Secondly, there is the argument of equality or equity. Management already has the tremendous advantage of depending upon the corporate'treasury. Should not a nonexpenditures of an individual "paid or incurred
for the production or collection
of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income." The leading case interpreting the section is Bingham's Trust v. Commfsssoner, 325 U.S. 365, 65 Sup. Ct. 1232 (1945). There is no
case considering specifically the deductibility of proxy solicitation expenses. Compare McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 65 Sup. Ct. 96 (1944); Commissioner v. Josephs, 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v. Heide, 165
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948); Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d
460 (3d Cir. 1945); and Marion A. Burr Beck, 15 T.C. 642 (1950) wsmh Hochschild v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947); Stella Elkins Tyler 6 T.C.
135 (1946); and Heller v. Comimssioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945). Perhaps if the corporation reimbursed the non-management group, the corporation
would be in a better position under Code § 23 (a) (1) (A) to deduct non-management expenses.
:' Friedman, supra note 12, at 953. See also Loss, SECUITIEs REGULATION 554
(1951).
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management group with real merit in its proposals at least be allowed reimbursement for its expenditures?
(1)

Successful Oppostion
The argument advanced in the last paragraph is, of course, strongest in
the case of an opposition group that gains control of the corporation. It is
clear in such a case that a majority of stockholders believed the proposals of
new management to be the soundest and in the best interests of the corporation. Certainly, if the solicitation expenses of old management whose views
were rejected should be borne by the corporation, new management should
be reimbursed.
This was the position adopted in the sole case to consider the problem.
Stemnberg v. Adams29 involved a proxy contest in which the non-management group were successful in electing their slate of candidates to the board
of directors. Old management spent something over $20,000 in the contest; the opposition spent about $27,000. Old management defrayed its
expenses from the corporate treasury while in office. When new management came into office it thereupon reimbursed itself for its proxy expenses
out of corporate funds. This action was later ratified by the stockholders.
A stockholder then brought a derivative action in the name of the corporation against the old and new directors for the total proxy contest expenses
incurred by both sides. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed
by plaintiffs and defendants. The trial judge denied the motions on the
ground that he did not have sufficient facts before him to tell whether or
not a question of "policy" was involved in the proxy contest The court indicated, however, that he would have granted defendants' motion if he had
been satisfied that the dispute was over a matter of "policy." He was not
concerned that the insurgents had reimbursed themselves for their expenditures "unless these were unreasonable." On this question the court concluded:
My own choice is to draw no distinction between the "ins" and the successful "outs." I see no reason why the stockholders should not be free to
reimburse those whose expenditures succeeded in ridding a corporation of a
policy frowned upon by a majority of the stockholders. Once we assert
that incumbent directors may employ corporate funds in policy contests to
advocate their views to the stockholders even if the stockholders ultimately
reject their views, it seems permissible to me that those who advocate a
contrary policy and succeed in securing approval from the stockholders
should be able to receive reimbursement, at least where there is approval by
both the board of directors and a majority of the stockholders. An analogy may be found in the reimbursement of the successful stockholder who
brings a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation. There he is
reimbursed regardless of the views of the stockholders.
90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
'Old. at 607
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The reasomng of the court on the issue of reimbursing the successful
insurgent group is sound. Although we may disagree with the court's adhering to the "policy" vs. "personnel" formula, its theory that a successful
opposition which proves to be representing the thinking of a majority of
the stockholders should be reimbursed does not seem open to dispute.
(2)

Uusuccessful Oppostmon.

But what of the unsuccessful contestants? Is there any plausible basis
for an argument that they should be reinbursed? Apparently members of
the bar have not thought about the possibilities, or have not believed such
a course of action proper, for no suits to reimburse defeated contestants have
yet been reported.
And yet, if an "outside" group has honestly proposed an intelligent
course of conduct, and has received the support of a substantial body of
stockholders, is there not a reasonable basis for reimbursing them from the
corporate treasury? Certainly there is as much ground for reimbursing unsuccessful insurgents as there is for upholding the use of corporate funds by
= 31
a defeated management.
Corporate payments to both groups can be justified on the basic ground of fully informing the stockholder. For he is entitled to have both sides of the argument, not just that of successful management, nor that of successful opposition.
A recent artide has presented a well documented argument in favor of
reimbursing unsuccessful opposition groups. 32 The writer finds support
from case law development and from the change in stockholder-management relations effected over the past two decades by statute and adminstrative action. The case law development lending support to the proposed
course of action comprises those decisions permitting reimbursement to directors or stockholders where their legal actions have "benefited" the corporation. For example, a number of cases have authorized reimbursement for
a directors expenses in successfully defending on the merits a stockholder's
action against him for alleged wrongdong. 33 The corporation is benefited
because directors are encouraged to defend themselves against unfounded
charges thus ensuring the retention of good personnel. And, again, stockholders and their counsel have been reimbursed where the result of their
14
action was to eliminate unfavorable restrictuons.
'Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
'Friedman, supra note 12, at 958 et seq.
'In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950); Solimine v.
HolLander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941); Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis.
594, 109 N.W 581 (1906),rehearnsgdened,110 N.W 798 (1907). See Washington, Littgatiom Expenses of Corporate Directors m Stockholders' Suits, 40 COL. L
Ray. 431 (1940).
"N.Y. Central R!L v. N.Y. & H. RM, 275 App.Div. 604, 90 N.Y.S.2d 309, aff'd,
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The statute and administrative action referred to above is, of course,
Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act 35 and the proxy regulation authorized by that section. In the course of administering its powers under
that section the SEC has asserted not only the power to ensure that the stockholder receives full information, but it has asserted the authority to make the
corporate management take affirmative steps. Through the adoption of
Rule X-14A-8 management must provide a method whereby stockholders
may present ideas and suggestions to fellow stockholders for their consideration and vote. It is through such an extension of the philosophy of Section
14 that the writer above mentioned believes the commission has the power
to amend the proxy regulation to require management to reimburse unsuccessful opposition groups.
One immediate objection to reimbursing unsuccessful opposition groups
will be the argument that the corporation must underwrite every stockholder's scheme however ill advised. No doubt there are stockholders' proposals which border on the "crack-poe' variety and no beneficial corporate
purpose will be served by their discussion. Some method must be devised
for ensuring that the corporation stand the expense of only meritorious
contests.
One method for so limiting corporate liability would be to utilize the
plan followed in the proposal rule (X-14A-8) of the proxy regulation."
That rule provides that management does not have to enclose a stockholder's
proposal in its proxy material if "substantially the same" proposal was submitted to the stockholders in the previous year and it received a favorable
vote from less than 3 % of the stockholders voting on the proposal. While
the number of stockholders voting in favor of a proposal is not necessarily
a criterion for measuring merit, it does show stockholder reaction as to its
worth. And this factor is important in determining possible benefit to the
corporation.
In order to arrive at a proper minimum percentage figure a study of
votes cast in proxy contests would have to be made. The 3% figure is
probably too low. Some figure around 10% or 15% would probably be
closer to the proper minmum requirement. In the survey of voting under
Rule X-14A-8 discussed in a recent article it was found that 30% of the
proposals obtained an affirmative vote of less than 3%, and 60% of the
proposals obtained less than 8%.7 On the basis of such figures an affirma301 N.Y. 567, 93 N.E.2d 451 (1949). See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee fn Stockholder's Derwatwe Suits, 39 COL. L. REV. 784, 799 (1939).

'See note 6 supra.
'For the same suggestion see Friedman, supra note 12, at 963.
'Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy ProposalRule, The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. OF
Cmi. L. REv. 807, 828-830 (1952)
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tive vote of 10% in proxy contests would not seem too high to justify
corporate reimbursement for expenditures of an unsuccessful opposition.
It must be remembered also that expense figures on both sides will be
materially reduced if, as suggested above, payments for hired solicitors and
last-minute telegrams and telephone calls to stockholders are limited, or not
permitted, as proper corporate expenditures.
(3)

Incluston of OppositionNominees %nManagement Proxy Statennts
and Proxy Ballots.
If it be thought that the reimbursement of either successful or unsuccessful opposition groups would result in burdensome drains on corporate
cash and working capital generally there is yet another way to achieve more
equality. All nominees, management and opposition, could be listed in the
opening management proxy statement and opportunity given for voting by
an accompanying proxy ballot Such a suggestion was made by the SEC
in 1942, reiterated by a Chicago business man on a proposal for corporate
action, and recently renewed by another writer 38 Moreover, this could be
accomplished in most instances without statutory or regulation changes by
means of an amendment to the original charter or by-laws. Amending the
SEC proxy regulation could achieve such a result far more quickly and uniformly than by piecemeal and scattered by-law amendment
In one form, the proposal has been that nominations for directors could
only be made by signators owning of record at least 5,000 shares. Furthermore, there would be included in the management proxy statement the same
informauon at present required by the SEC for management nominees for
directorships, and 100 words giving the nominees' qualifications. An opportunity to vote for the non-management candidates would also be afforded by means of appropriate boxes to be carried in the management form
of proxy.30
Essentially this technique would merely carry the proxy proposal rule
one step further. Non-management groups could not only propose issues to
stockholders for their consideration via the management proxy statement,
but they could also place the names of nominees for the Board of Directors
before stockholders. The suggestion would eliminate inequality to only a
limited extent since any further solicitation by the non-management group
would necessitate personal expenditures. However, names and some infor'SEC Act Release No. 3347 at 2 (Dec. 18, 1942); Illinois Central R. Co. 1949
proxy statement, discussed in Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Proposal Rule, The
Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. OF CI. L. REv. 807, 818, 819 (1952); Caplin, Proxes,
Aunnal Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The lawyer's Role, 37 VA- L. REV.
653 (1951).
' See Illinois Central R. Co. 1949 proxy statement, Emerson and Latcham, SEC
Proxy ProposalRule, The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. oF Cur. L. REv. 807, 818, 819
(1952).
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matron about nominees for both groups would originally be presented before the stockholders at the same time and in the same instrument: significant factors which in themselves would constitute long steps toward more
equal treatment for all groups.
Conclrlson
The problem of expenditures in a proxy contest is one of vital importance in the field of stockholder democracy. The early development of the
law has been extremely favorable to the "ins," while entirely ignoring the
"outs." The "policy" vs. "personnel" limitation upon corporate expenditures by management has in actuality amounted to very nebulous distinctions being drawn. Management has been left by the courts in the comfortable position of being able in most cases to defend its position of control through the use of corporate funds. More recently, however, one court
of reimbursing
has recognized the justification, when the issue was put to it,
a successful opposition from corporate funds. Furthermore, it would seem
that in the interests of adequate stockholder information an unsuccessful
opposition group that has made a substantial showing on the basis of votes
cast should also be entitled to reimbursement. The cases point towards
such a result if an action for reimbursement were brought. And the regulatory power of the SEC suggests that the Commission could validly require
reimbursement through administrative action. If reimbursement is considered too extreme a remedy, then the possibility of including the names of
non-management nominees in the management proxy statement should be
considered, not only as an alternative proposal, but also as a constructive
development in its own right.
The methods of resolving the matter of proxy solicitation expenses outlined above seems preferable to administrative action which would limit
the amount available for expenses to a prescribed limit and require parties
to request permission for expenditures beyond that amount.40 Such a more
stringent limitation would cause unnecessary inflexibility, it would seem.
Corporate expenditures are limted by the rule of "reasonableness." If both
sides know that their own expenditures plus those of the opposition may
be met out of the corporate treasury, there should be some reluctance on the
part of both sides to spend an unreasonable amount.
"This is the theory of Rule U-65, General Rules and Regulations, Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935. Under Rule U-65 a corporation is permitted to
spend an amount sufficient to cover the ordinary costs of preparing, assembling and
mailing proxy solicitation material, plus $1,000 in any calendar year. If the corporation wishes to spend a greater sum a dedaration must be filed with the Commission.
See Standard Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7020 (Dec. 2,
1946) denying the effectiveness of a declaration for estimated expenditures of
$21,000. See also Loss, SEactiTiEs REGULATION 554 (1951).

